Wills and Testaments: Interpretation

It is trite that the law of succession aims to give effect to the wishes of the testator. Accordingly, when a person passes on and leaves a will or a testament, it is the duty of the court interpreting the will or testament to make an order that obeys the wishes of the testator as far as legally possible.

This article will look at the two competing approaches taken by courts in the interpretation of wills and testaments – namely the golden rule and the use of armchair and extrinsic evidence – and attempt to identify the current approach taken by our courts.

I   The Golden Rule

The starting point for the interpretation of wills and testaments is the golden rule established in the case of Robertson v Robertson’s Executors 1914 AD 503. In this case, it was held that courts are to “ascertain the wishes of the testator from the language used. And, when these wishes are ascertained, the Court is bound to give effect to them, unless it is prevented by some rule or law from doing so”.

In other words, the golden rule holds that courts must ascertain the wishes or intentions of the testator by merely looking at the language used by the testator. Accordingly, this rule makes no provision for courts to have regard to external factors when interpreting the testator’s language

The rationale for restricting courts to the words used by the testator in their will or testament is because the testator’s words are the primary indication of their intention. Therefore, the courts are often reluctant to depart from the ordinary or literal meaning of the words used by the testator.

However, there have been some significant developments in the approach of our courts to the interpretation of wills and testaments since the golden rule was established. One such development is the use of armchair and extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of wills and testaments.

II   Armchair and Extrinsic Evidence

Armchair evidence sees a court placing itself in the position of the testator in order to determine their intention. In other words, a court puts itself in the armchair of the testator to understand their thought process in the creation of their will.

Extrinsic evidence is evidence that is obtained elsewhere, i.e. not from the will itself. Extrinsic evidence, therefore, refers to the surrounding circumstances or factors accompanying the will.

In Cuming v Cuming 1945 AD 201, it was held that armchair and extrinsic evidence may only be used if the wording of the will is ambiguous or uncertain, and the intention of the testator cannot be determined merely by examining the wording used in the will.

In other words, when armchair and extrinsic evidence is used in situations where the testator’s use of language is ambiguous, the courts can step into the shoes of the testator and investigate the surrounding circumstances of the creation of the will in order to determine the testator’s intention at the time of creating the will.

However, this line of reasoning has been challenged. In Allen v Estate Bloch 1970 (2) SA 376 (C), the court held armchair evidence to be admissible in cases where there is no ambiguity or uncertainty regarding the words that the testator used in their will. In this case, the court held that the correct approach is that a will should not be analysed in isolation. It is seen as a more practical approach to ascertain the intention of the testator, as it takes into account all the relevant factors surrounding the creation of the will.

III   Conclusion: What is the Approach of Our Courts?

The case law regarding whether or not the golden rule is still adhered to by courts remains inconclusive. The magnitude of case law seems to suggest that, to a large extent, our courts do not follow the golden rule, but rather follow the reasoning of the Cuming case, which allows for the use of armchair and extrinsic evidence only where the wording used by the testator is ambiguous.

To summarise, it is evident that our courts still use the golden rule as the starting point for interpreting wills and testaments, but it is generally no longer used in isolation.

Reference List:

  • Robertson v Robertson’s Executors 1914 AD 503.
  • Jamneck, et al The Law of Succession in South Africa 2 ed (2012).
  • Cuming v Cuming 1945 AD 201.
  • Allen v Estate Bloch 1970 (2) SA 376 (C).

This article is a general information sheet and should not be used or relied on as legal or other professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact your legal adviser for specific and detailed advice. Errors and omissions excepted (E&OE)

Contact Us